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WILLS AND TRUSTS
by
Richard W. Hemingway*

T

HIS Article
is intended
to survey
caseslastin Annual
the willsSurvey
and trusts
decided
by the
Texas courts
since the
issue, area
and
covers cases appearing in volumes 406 through 417 of the South Western
Reporter, Second Series. No attempt has been made to report all the cases,
and only those which are deemed significant or of special interest have
been included. The two most significant cases of the preceding year were
In the Matter of the Guardianshipof Neal' concerning gifts by a guardian,
and Thorman v. Carr' dealing with allocation of trust income. For the
convenience of the reader an outline of the cases reported follows. A numerical reference has been made to the paragraph in the Article where a
particular case appears.
I. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION

(1) Distribution to grandparents-moieties, Golden v. York.4
II.

WILLS-FORMALITIES AND VALIDITY

(2)

Holographic will-printed name of beneficiary, Gunn v.
Phillips."
(3) Attested will-notary as witness, Cooper v. Liverman."
III.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTIONAL

PROBLEMS AND EFFECT OF

PROVISIONS

(4) Partial intestacy, implied 7gift of property by gift of income, Haile v. Holtzclaw.
(5) Partial intestacy resulting from clause in will of surviv* B.S., University of Colorado; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'The following cases were considered but are not included in the discussion. An indication of
the subject of each case is set forth for the reader's convenience:
Wills: Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1966) (undue influence); Roberts v. Roberts, 407
S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1966) (effect of dead man's statute on witness proving up a holographic will);
Ward v. Braun, 417 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (setting aside homestead and widow's
allowance); Childre v. Childre, 417 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (time limit for filing of
claims against estate); Allen v. Bolton, 416 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (filing of second
will); Rider v. Reeder, 415 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error dismissed (suits against administrator, venue); Alamo Candy Co. v. Zacharias, 408 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(liability of community property in wife's hands for payment of community debts).
Trusts: Wilson v. Willbanks, 417 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (purchase money resulting trust); Billingsley v. Walker, 417 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
(vesting of employee's interest in profit-sharing trust); Little v. Deaton, 416 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967) (creditors of trust beneficiary); Mayflower Trust Co. v. NoweU, 413 S.W.2d 783
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error dismissed (venue); General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, Inc. v. General Ass'n of Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, 410 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (disposition of properties of defunct church organization).
'407 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1966).
a412 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1967).
4410 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1966).
' 410 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
'414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967).
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ing spouse dealing only with W's one-half of the community property, Winkler v. Pitre.'
(6) "Death without issue," Harrison v. Brown.
(7) Perpetuities, Sellers v. Powers.10
(8) Contractual wills between H and W, oral contract, part

performance, Meyer v. Texas National Bank of Commerce."
(9)
IV.

Effect of lapse in residuary clause, Adams v. Masterson."

WILLs-GUARDIANSHIP, ADMINISTRATION

(10)

Child support obligation as binding estate, Hutchings

v. Bates."
(11)

"Aggrieved"

persons, In re Guardianship of Price v.

Murfee.'"
(12)

Independent administration, expenses, attorney's fees,
forum, Thornhill v. Elskes."

(13)

Attempted gift by ward's estate to avoid estate taxes,
In the Matter of the Guardianshipof Neal."

V. PRIVATE TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIONAL PROBLEMS AND EFFECT
OF PROVISIONS

(14) Class gifts, perpetuities, Rekdahl v. Long."
(15)

Effect of attempted inter vivos trust, with retention of
control by settlor, Marshall v. Land.'8

VI. PRIVATE TRUSTS-ADMINISTRATION
(16) Sale of securities, allocation of income and principal,

Thorman v. Carr."9
(17)

Failure of trustee to make estate productive, right of

beneficiary, Langford v. Shamburger."'
VII. CHARITABLE TRUSTS

(18)

Deviation from trust purposes, change of circumstances,

Coffee v. William Rice University."
(19)

Park for use of subdivision owners, Butler v. Shelton."

VIII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

(20)
(21)
(22)
8410 S.W.2d
9416 S.W.2d
"410 S.W.2d
11412 S.W.2d
"415 S.W.2d

Payment of funeral expenses.
Lowering age for execution of will.
Form of order granting letters testamentary or of administration and appointment of appraisers and appraisement.
677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)

"406 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966).
14408 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"412 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
10407 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1966).
17417 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1967).
" 413 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
'9412 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1967).
20417 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
2"408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
2408 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)

error rel. n.r.e.
error ref. n.r.e.
error granted.
error granted.
error ref. n..e.

error granted.
error ref. n.r.e.
error ref. n.r.e.
error ref. n.r.e.
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WILLS AND TRUSTS
I.

DESCENT AND

DISTRIBUTION

(1) The Texas Supreme Court in Golden v. York handed down a
decision dealing with the division of an intestate decedent's estate into
moieties, where deceased died without surviving parents, brothers or
sisters, or their descendants. The case is noteworthy as the statutory provision is ambiguous in several respects and has seldom been interpreted.
In this case, intestate was survived by descendants of his maternal
grandparents and descendants of his paternal great-grandparents. Although Probate Code section 34(4) provides for the division of a decedent's estate into two moieties, "one of which shall go to the paternal and
the other to the maternal kindred,""' maternal descendants claimed the
whole estate. This claim was based on the ground that the maternal descendants claimed through an ancestor of closer relationship with the deceased than did the paternal heirs. It was argued that, as there were no
descendants from the deceased paternal grandparents, before the paternal
moiety would ascend to the paternal great-grandparent level, there must
be no surviving descendants from either side of the family on the grandparent level. However, it was held that the paternal moiety passed to the
paternal kindred from the great-grandparents and not to the maternal
kindred, and that each moiety would pass separately among the respective
maternal and paternal descendants, without regard to the comparative degree of relationship of the ancestor through which such claim is made.
Confusion in statutory interpretation is caused by the last sentence in
section 38 (4): "If there is no surviving grandfather or grandmother, then
the whole of such estate shall go to their descendants, and so on without
end, passing in like manner to the nearest lineal ancestors and their descendants."' Although the language is susceptible to an interpretation
that the estate is to be distributed as an entirety to all descendants surviving on the nearest ascending level, it appears to be the law in Texas
that after the estate is divided into two moieties, each moiety will descend separately and independently of the other. This will be true both for
the purpose of determining the descendants who will take and the level
upon which a per capita division will be made among the survivors on
that level and decedents leaving lineal descendants which will take by
representation." The Golden case is consistent with the existing case law
on the subject.
II.

WILLS-FORMALITIES AND VALIDITY

Although no cases were decided by the supreme court in this area, two
cases were decided by courts of civil appeals, one dealing with formalities
necessary for a holographic will and the other with the question of
"3410
4

S.W.2d 181

(Tex. 1966).

TEx. PROB. CODE ANN.

§ 38(a)(4)

(1966).

Id. (emphasis added).
26

See Witherspoon v. Jernigan, 97 Tex. 98, 76 S.W. 445

(1883); McKinney v. Abbott, 49 Tex. 371

(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).

(1903); Young v. Gray, 60 Tex. 541

(1878); Hartely v. Langdon & Co., 347 S.W.2d 749
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whether the notary public signing the self-proving clause is an attesting
witness to a will.
(2) In Gunn v. Phillips7 the court had before it a holographic will
which was entirely in cursive writing of the deceased with the exception
of the name of the devisee, which was printed."8 The will was denied probate on the ground that the witnesses could not testify that the devisee's
name was written by the testator, neither witness having seen or been
familiar with the printing of the decedent.
Although the court in this case assumed that a printed name would
be in the "handwriting" of a decedent, no Texas case has so held, nor,
apparently, discussed the question. Indeed, only one case in the United
States has been found on point."9 It was there considered that a will which
was entirely printed, including the signature of the testator, was a valid
holographic will in the "handwriting" of the deceased. No authority was
cited except a definition of "handwriting" from Ballentine's Law Dictionary to the effect that "handwriting includes, generally, whatever the
person has written with his hand, and not merely his common and usual
style of chirography."
The reason for excepting the holographic will from the stringent requirements of attested execution is based upon the protection afforded by
identification of writing as the decedent's. This of course may be done by
witnesses familiar with the deceased's signature, or by handwriting experts. Whether printing by the decedent is acceptable as "handwriting"
of the deceased should be based upon the question of whether printing is
capable of identification with the same precision as cursive writing. Although no extensive search was made on this point, handwriting authorities apparently would give an affirmative answer to the question.
1 there was
(3) In Cooper v. Liverman"
an extension of existing case law
that a self-proving clause does not constitute a part of the will. In the
subject case one 0. P. Deaner executed a holographic will, dated September 6, 1962. Later, on July 5, 1963, he executed a typewritten codicil.
A self-proving affidavit on a separate sheet of paper was executed on
July 13, 1963, and attached to the codicil. Mr. Deaner died two days
later. The codicil was executed by the deceased as testator and by two
attesting witnesses; however, it was shown that one of the witnesses did
not sign in the presence of the testator, contrary to the express requirements of section 59 of the Texas Probate Code."1 Proponents of the codicil
27410 S.W.2d 202

(Tex. Civ. App.

1966)

error ref. n.r.e.

" The will in point read as follows:
To N. L. Phillips: or family
I George E. Gunn Leave any and everything I own or am entitled to in any way
to N. L. Phillips or his family and I demand that all of my possessions be turned
over to him or his family without any Restrictions what so ever from any one. I
Request that he or them Pay all just debts if any. [T]here is no witness to this will
only my personal Signature which can be verified at the Bank.
George E. Gunn.
The name "N. L. Phillips" was printed. Id at 204.
2
Alexander's Estate v. Hatcher, 193 Miss. 369, 9 So. 2d 791 (1942).
30406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
t

" TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. S 59 (1966).
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contended that the notary's signature on the self-proving clause would
be sufficient to supply the second required witness. The codicil was denied
probate on the ground that the self-proving clause was not a part of the
codicil and, therefore, any signature thereon would not fulfill the subscribing witness requirement.
Cooper is the third case to so interpret the effect of signatures following the self-proving clause when proper signatures are not found following the attestation clause of the will. 2 In all three cases the instruments were denied probate on the rationale that the self-proving provisions attached to a will are not a part of the will and concern the matter
of its proof only. The execution of a valid will is a condition precedent to
the usefulness of the self-proving provisions of section 59 of the Probate
Code.
Although the law in Texas now seems fairly well settled in this regard,
it would seem that the rationale for such a result is subject to some criticism. A will has been considered validly executed where a considerable
blank space appears between the end of the will and the executory signatures." If the self-proving clause is to be disregarded as having any
legal effect as part of the will itself, it would seem that the same factual
situation would result as in the case of signatures separated by a blank
space. This should follow also where the self-proving clause is found on
paper physically attached to the will or shown by proof to have been
present with the will at the time of the executory acts. 4 Where a testator
or a witness has signed with an intent to effectuate the will, the question
should be addressed to the character of proof necessary to demonstrate the
acts and intent of the parties, not to where signatures are placed on the
paper." This should be especially true in Texas where a testator is not required to publish his will," nor to sign it in the presence of the witnesses. Witnessing is the mental act of comprehending the signature of
the testator, with the subscription of a witness's signature merely indicating such comprehension." ' Although the self-proving clause may not be a
part of the will, or if considered a part of the will to be disregarded as
superfluous, this is no bar to a conclusion that the paper upon which the
self-proving clause and disputed signature are found is to be considered
part of the will.
32The

other two cases are Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966)

(signature of witness

following self-proving clause); McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
error ref. (signature of testator in self-proving clause).
'In
re Singer's Will, 19 Misc. 679, 44 N.Y.S. 606 (Sur. Ct. 1897) (two blank pages
between testator's signature and signature of attesting witnesses); see In re Panousseris' Will, 52
Del. 21, 151 A.2d 518 (Orphans' Ct. 1959).
34See In re Panousseris' Will, 52 Del. 21, 151 A.2d 518 (Orphans' Ct. 1959); In re Dunlap's
Will, 87 Okla. 95, 209 P. 651 (1922).
' Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885) (county clerk); Mortgage Bond Corp. v. Haney,
105 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.; Saathoff v. Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937) error ref. (signature of notary under jurat to will held good witness).
36
Leeder v. Leeder, 161 S.W.2d 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
' See In re Panousseris' Will, 52 Del. 21, 151 A.2d 518 (Orphans' Ct. 1959); In re Dunlap's
Will, 87 Okla. 95, 209 P. 651 (1922).
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EFFECT OF PROVISIONS

As might be expected, the most numerous as well as the most interesting
cases in the wills area were found dealing with problems of the meaning
and effect of language. Cases decided dealt with three problem areas that
are seldom litigated in Texas: the meaning of the phrase "death without
issue;" perpetuities; and, the effect of a lapse in the residuary clause.
(4) Two cases decided during the last year provide an illustration of
slippage that may develop between the conception of a testamentary plan
and its execution. In each instance the result was a partial intestacy.
In Haile v. Holtzclaw 8 the draftsman failed in two respects. The first
failure occurred in providing for the disposition of income from real property and failing to provide for disposition of the realty itself. The court
found from provisions in the will giving the wife full right to expend
and dispose of income an implication of ownership of the right to the
income from both the real and personal property (except royalty income).
However, the court correctly rejected the contention that a right to ownership and disposition of income from the real property also by implication
vested title to the corpus of the real property in the owner of the income.

The holding therefore was that the right to two-elevenths of the royalty

income had vested in the surviving spouse for life, with no disposition
being made of the remainder interests.

The second error of the draftsman was to draft a residuary clause which
would only be operative if testator survived his spouse, which did not
occur. The result was that all real property (excluding the royalty income)
passed by intestacy at the death of the testator as did the right to royalty
income following the death of the surviving spouse.
The case is a good example of a draftsman getting lost in a maze of his
own creation. It might be suggested that when drafting a complex will, a
chart be made of each type of property interest created, present and future,
real and personal, so that one may be certain proper disposition has been
made of all property. Additionally, the residuary clause must be broad

enough to catch all interests either not disposed of by the will, or which
may lapse by operation of law on the death of named takers.
(5) In the other case, Winkler v. Pitre,3 ' the husband again predeceased
his wife, leaving her all of his property. Upon the death of the wife and
probate of her will, a question was raised whether the wife's will also disposed of the property she had previously acquired from her husband. Her
will did not contain a residuary clause and throughout the wife prefaced
dispositive provisions with the words "my half." The court concluded it
was apparent that testatrix intended the recipients named in her will to
ultimately receive all of the property. However, she apparently expected
them to receive one-half from her and the other one-half from the will of
her husband. Since she had outlived her husband these provisions in his
will never became effective as to the other intended recipients.
3'414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967).
8410 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
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In both of the above cases the cause of intestacy was partly due to the
fact that the respective draftsmen were incorrect in their assumptions as
to the order of death of husband and wife and made no alternative provisions. It is highly probable that a majority of will construction cases
are caused by failure of a draftsman to answer the question "when."
Commonly overlooked is the practical effect of a will being an ambulatory
instrument, with the result that language used may be capable of producing differing results depending upon the time at which the language
is applied to the existing facts.
(6) In Harrisonv. Brown'0 the court had before it the construction of
the phrase "die without issue." Unless defined, the phrase is inherently ambiguous, both as to substantive meaning and as to time of application.
Testatrix executed a will devising property to her son for life, with remainder over to his five children. The will contained a provision that
"should any of said children die without issue, then the share of such
child or children so dying without issue is hereby devised in fee to the
survivor or survivors of such child or children of my son, . . ."' Testatrix
was survived by the life tenant son, and all five grandchildren. The son
died in 1958 and in 1963 testatrix' granddaughter, Pauline, died leaving
all of her property to her husband, Gus, her only survivor. Pauline had
never had children born or adopted by her.
Suit was brought by Pauline's surviving sisters against Gus, the surviving husband, for Pauline's interest on the ground that the phrase "die
without issue" meant to so die at any time. The court correctly held that
the estate of Pauline became absolutely vested at the death of the life tenant and therefore passed to her husband and not to the surviving sisters.
The court found a manifestation of intent from a consideration of the

wording of the instant will and that of a former revoked will. It was
further stated that if such express intent was absent, the same result
would occur from application of rules of construction as to implied intent.
The phrase "die without issue" has an interesting history and it is
doubtful that everyone using this verbiage is aware of the inherent ambiguities that lurk therein." Initially courts were concerned with the problem of when issue must fail in order for the alternative gift to vest. Where
a gift was made to "A, and if he die without issue, then to B and his
heirs," early English cases made a distinction between the concepts of definite and indefinite failure of issue. A definite failure of issue could only

occur at the time of the death of A. If A died leaving issue, B, or B's heirs,
would never take. On the other hand, under the indefinite failure concept,
failure of issue could occur at any time, either at the death of A or in
succeeding

generations, i.e., if A's line of issue ultimately died
out, the
property would then vest in B, or if B were dead, in B's successors.

Although there are no Texas cases directly on point, the view in the
United States has been to interpret the phrase as denoting a definite failure
40 416 S.W.2d 613
41

id. at 615.
'See generally L.

(Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
SIMES,

error ref. n.r.e.

THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

SS

97-100 (2d ed. 1966).
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of issue and to construe the gift as a fee simple subject to an executory
interest ' in B and his heirs. It is therefore well settled that A must die
without issue in order to vest the gift in B, and if A dies with issue B will
never take. However, this does not answer a second and more pertinent
question, namely when must A die without issue for B to take. Restating
the form of the gift in the subject case: T to A for life, remainder to A's
children, but if any of A's children die without issue, then such child's
interest to B. Any child of A could die without issue at any one of three
different times: (1) prior to the death of the testator; (2) following the
death of the testator but before the death of the life tenant; or, (3) after
the death of the life tenant.
If the phrase is construed to mean that a child must die without issue
prior to the death of the life tenant (or prior to the death of the testator,
as the case may be), the gift is clearly substitutional, viz., at A's death
either the child of A or B will take, but in no event will both take. Where
a child outlives A, B will never take this child's share, even if the child
later dies without issue. Only if a child dies without issue prior to the
death of A, would the property vest in B.
On the other hand, if the phrase is construed as denoting that the child
may die without issue at any time, either before or after the death of A,
the gift would be successive; a future interest would be created in B and
both the child of A and B may take." The child will take by outliving A;
B or B's successors can take if the child subsequently dies without issue.
The questions presented in the subject case are twofold: (a) whether
Texas will follow a successive or substitutional concept of death without
issue in this situation, and (b) if it follows the substitutional concept,
the time at which a child must die without issue in order for B to take.
Meager case law exists in Texas on this question. It has been held that Texas
will follow a successive approach when the gift is in the form of "T to A
and his heirs, but if A die without issue, to B."' On the other hand, Texas
has followed the substitutional rule where the gift has been in the form of
"T to A, and if he die, to B."'" Where the gift is in the same form as
in the subject case, i.e., a life estate in A, followed by a remainder to B,
with gift to C upon B's death without issue, it appears this is a case of first
impression in this jurisdiction.
The majority view in the United States is that the gift is substitutional
on the death of the life tenant,"7 a view which was followed by the subject
case. This approach is rational and consistent with other rules of construction as to presumed intent dealing with the time of closing of class gifts
43d.

4"For ease in understanding the gifts may be paraphrased: If substitutional: T to A for life,
remainder to A's children, but if any of A's children die without issue before the death of A,
then to B. If successive: T to A for life, remainder to A's children, but if any of A's children die
without issue at any time, then to B.
'St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Freeman, 102 Tex. 376, 117 S.W. 425 (1909); Cruse v. Reinhard,
208 S.W.2d $98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error -ref. n.r.e.

4"Berry v. Cunningham, 99 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
4
See also Flores v. DeGarza, 44 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932) cited in subject case.
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and implied conditions of survivorship, which many times are tied to the
time of distribution of the life tenant's estate.

It might be mentioned that several other problems have arisen which
may not have been adequately litigated in Texas and which should be anticipated by the careful draftsman. Does a person die without issue when a
child is born to him during his lifetime but the child dies before the par-

ent? No basis can be seen for implying a condition of survivorship by the
child to the time of the death of the parent. Texas apparently follows this
view." It would also seem that a child in gestation should be considered
a child in being to prevent death without issue." A further question may
arise as to the meaning of the word "issue." The English view is to include
all lineal descendants as per capita takers, whether or not there are living

ancestors, i.e., both children and grandchildren of T would be classified as
issue. The prevailing viewpoint in this country is to construe issue as being those persons who would take within the statute of descent and distribution if T died intestate. But what about adopted and illegitimate chil-

dren? No answer is found in Texas.
(7) A perpetuities issue was involved in Sellers v. Powers,"° in which
writ has been granted by the Texas Supreme Court. The gift in a will,

which is set forth below, 1 was in the form of: "T to A and B as joint tenants for life, remainder to the issue of A and B as joint tenants for life,
remainder in fee to those persons who would take under the statute of
descent and distribution as if T had died intestate immediately after the
death of the last life tenant to die." A and B survived T and both had

children born to them. The contest was between the children of A and
B, and A, one of the parents. The trial court construed the will as giving

A and B life estates; remainder to the children of the first to die of either
A or B, for life pur autre vie the survivor of A and B; and, upon the death
of the last to die of A and B, remainder in fee to the heirs of T to be determined at that time.
4 Giraud

v. Crockett,

142 S.W.2d

243

(Tex.

Civ. App.

1940)

error ref. According

Professor Simes this is the minority view.
49James v. James, 164 S.W. 47

(Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
'0410 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.

5 Third I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my said property and
.. .to my daughter Edna Ray Sellers Walker, and my son Johnny Ray Sellers
estate
for life, if they both survive me, to have and to hold said residue of my estate as
joint tenants during their joint lives; provided, however, if only one of my said
children survive me, or if both survive me but one later dies then I give and devise
to my surviving child an estate for life in one-half of said residue and to the living
issue of my deceased child an estate for life in the other one-half of said residue.
Upon the death of the last survivor of my son and daughter, or upon my death if
neither my son nor my daughter survive me, I give, devise and bequeath all the
rest and residue of my estate to the issue of my daughter . . . and my son ....
as joint tenants during the respective lives of such issue and the life of the survivor,
or, if only one of such issue survives me, then I give and devise such property and
estate to such survivor for life.
Fourth Upon the death of the last surviving life tenant heretofore provided for in
paragraph Third of this will, I give, devise and bequeath the remainder of my said
property and estate in fee simple title to the person who would be entitled to inherit
said property in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution of the State
of Texas, if I had died intestate immediately after the death of the last surviving life
tenant heretofore provided for in paragraph Third of this will.

to
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A appealed on the grounds, (1) that voiding any part of the gift by
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities would so distort the testamentary plan that the entire devise must be abrogated and property should
descend by descent and distribution, and (2) that it was error to vest a
fee estate in the grandchildren who were only given a life estate by the
terms of the will. The judgment of the trial court was upheld in the court
of civil appeals on the ground that a general intent may be perceived from
the will to provide for T's children and grandchildren by a series of life
estates, and that only the particular provision affected by the Rule should
be declared void.
It is noted that writ has been granted in this case by the Texas Supreme
Court, and perhaps discussion should be curtailed. However, several matters seem significant. In the first place it would appear that only the gift
over following the death of the last of the issue of A and B to die violates
the Rule. The Rule may be paraphrased that interests will be declared void
that may not vest within twenty-one years after the death of some life in
being at the time an instrument takes effect. As this case is being litigated
during the lifetimes of A and B there is no basis upon which to apply the
"wait and see" doctrine to determine if, in fact, all interests will vest before the period of the Rule, i.e., if at the death of the last to die of A or B,
all of their lineal descendants have predeceased them.
A and B are the only lives in being. Their children cannot be classified
as lives in being, even those that are alive at T's death, as the gift over is
to a class and not to individual children. For a class to serve as lives in
being, all possible takers in the class must be in being at the time of death
of T. As both A and B are alive and are capable in law of having more
children, the living children of neither are lives in being. Although class
closing rules may sometimes split such a class by decreeing distribution
at a T's death, thereby constituting children then living as the sole members of the class and, hence, lives in being, such rules have no application
in this case. Therefore, for a gift in the will to be good, it must vest within
twenty-one years after the death of both A and B.
Following the gifts to A and B, the remaining gifts over are first to
"issue" and second to "takers within the laws of descent and distribution."
For gifts to violate the Rule they must be classified as contingent gifts.
The latter gift is clearly a contingent gift for it is essentially a gift to
heirs, to be determined at a date later than the death of the ancestor. However, there appears to be a split of authority whether implicit in the term
"issue" is an implied condition of survivorship. Whether a condition of
survivorship should be implied depends upon whether "issue" are considered more akin to "heirs" or to "children." The more popular view (questionable perhaps) is to imply a condition of survivorship, which would
result in a classification of the interest as a contingent remainder for life.
Treating both interests as contingent, will either or both remainders
vest within the period of the Rule? The answer seems to be yes, as to the
remainder to issue, and, no as to the remainder to heirs to be determined at
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the death of the last of the issue to die. The remainder to the issue of A
and B, if considered contingent, must vest as of the time of death of the
last to die of A and B, and is surely good. However, as some of the "issue"
may be born after T's death (as a class they may not be used as lives in
being), and, as there is no assurance that the last of the issue will die
within twenty-one years after the death of A or B, the gift over to heirs,
to be determined at the time of death of the last of the issue to die, is void.
From the facts as reported in the case no intention appears to have been
manifested by T as to disposition if any part of the gift violated the Rule.
The question involved is not as stated by the court of civil appeals, i.e.,
whether the prior life estates should be voided, but, on the contrary, what
disposition should be made of the remainder in fee. The action of the trial
court seems improper in (a) converting the gift to issue for life into a life
estate pur autre vie A and B, and (b) accelerating the time to determine
heirs for disposition of the fee from the death of the last to die of the
issue of A and B, to the time of death of A and B, the only lives in being.
This in large measure constitutes reformation of the will, which may not
be done. The only proper course seems to be to declare the remainder in fee
void, which interest will then fall into the residuary clause of the will (if
it has one) or will pass to the heirs of law of T to be determined as of the
time of T's death.
(8) As happens almost annually, the courts have again been presented
with a case of some significance involving wills that purportedly have been
drawn pursuant to a contract. The case is that of Meyer v. Texas National
Bank of Commerce," decided by a court of civil appeals and for which
writ has been granted by the Texas Supreme Court. The facts are well
stated by the court.
Joseph and Alpha Meyer, husband and wife, orally agreed to will their property to each other. Each executed a will leaving their property to the other.
Two months before his death, Joseph Meyer covertly and without the knowledge of Alpha Meyer, breached his agreement by executing a new will leaving his wife one-third and his brothers two-thirds of his estate. The wife
died 27 days [after Joseph died], without having executed a new will. Alpha's
estate seeks enforcement of the oral agreement she made with her husband,
and prayed that a trust be impressed in its favor on the two-thirds of the
estate devised to the two brothers."'
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
impressed a trust on two-thirds of Joseph's estate in favor of Alpha's
estate. This was affirmed by the court of civil appeals on the ground that
the oral contract had been taken out of the statute of frauds by part performance by Alpha, i.e., by dying, citing Kirk v. Beard.'
It is apparently settled in Texas that if wills are executed pursuant to
an oral contract, such contract may be proved by parol after the death of
one of the parties who has died without knowledge that the other party
52412 S.W.2d 957

(Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
id. at 959.
54162
Tex. 144, 345 S.W.2d 267 (1961).
5
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has changed his or her will. This was indicated in Weidner v. Crowther,"
and was so held in the Kirk case. However, in Kirk the parties involved
were brothers and no question was raised whether such a contract outside
the will could be entered into. The case in point is between husband and
wife and it has been held that such contract must arise from the wills,
either expressly or by implication, or such contract will be void as violative

of article 4610 in changing the order of descent."
As some confusion appears in the cases discussing the nature of the contract that will be enforced in the case of husband and wife, it will be interesting to see if the supreme court will address itself to this point as well
as to a discussion of the conceptual basis for allowing proof of the oral
contract after the death of one party.
(9) In a lower court opinion" it was held that where a later codicil
revoked two residuary gifts of one-fourth each, the portion of the residuary estate so revoked passed by intestacy to the heirs of the decedent
and did not go to augment the gifts of the remaining residuary takers.
Although the question of whether a lapse can occur in the residuary
clause has been discussed by writers in connection with a residuary clause
drawn in broad terms,"s the subject case is doubtlessly correct as the residuary clause here involved gave each taker a specific undivided interest
in the residue. No basis is present upon which to increase the stated share.
The clause is set forth below. '
IV.

WILLS-GARDIANSHIP,

ADMINISTRATION

(10) In another case of first impression, Hutchings v. Bates," the Texas
Supreme Court held that a contract for child support to last to a certain
age, without further provision, would survive the death of the promisor
and bind his estate until the termination date of the contract. In this case,
brought by the next friend of children of a first marriage against the surviving second wife of the deceased, the court noted two lines of authority
existed where a contract (such as in this case) did not expressly purport
to bind the heirs and personal representatives of the deceased and which
contained no affirmative provisions binding the promisor after death. One
line of decisions, following the common law rule, would hold that the
father's estate is not responsible for payments accruing after his death,
with the contrary line binding the estate unless it affirmatively appeared
that the obligation was purely personal. In following the second line of
" 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
S8Graser v. Graser, 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
7 Adams v. Masterson, 415 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
5
See generally T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953).
s THIRD: RESIDUARY ESTATE. I give, devise and bequeath my entire residuary
estate . . . to the following named persons in the proportions set opposite the name
of each if they are living at the time of my death, otherwise, the share of each such
person to vest in such person's heirs, or, if such person has died leaving a will, such
share to vest in such person's devisees and legatees under such will just as if the
bequests made herein were a part of such person's estate at the time of his death.
°406 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966). For further discussion, see Smith, Family Law, this Survey,
at footnote 65.
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authority, the rationale for the decision was stated to be upon the basic
principles of contract law that the obligation would be so binding unless
expressly limited.
(11) (12) Two civil appeals cases dealt with the question of jurisdiction of courts to allow attorney's fees. The first, In re Guardianship of
Price v. Murfee,6' held that the probate court and not the district court
had jurisdiction for approval of attorney's fees in guardianship cases, and
that Probate Code sections 4 and 2422 had changed prior law. In the
second case, Thornhill v. Elskes," the contrary result was reached where
the subject matter of the controversy was attorney's fees incident to independent administration, and it was held that the district court and not
the probate court had jurisdiction over approval.
The Price case, additionally, held that an "aggrieved" person under
sections 3 (r), 28, and 31 of the Probate Code64 was one who had a present
legal right in the property of the estate, and that grandchildren, who had
no further interest in the ward's estate, did not come within the definition.
5 one of the most
(13) In In the Matter of the Guardianship of Neal,"
important cases in the area for the year, the Texas Supreme Court refused
writ of error in a brief per curiam opinion, denying authorization for a
guardian to make a gift from the estate of a non compos mentis ninetysix year old ward to the residuary beneficiaries of the ward's will for the
purpose of reducing estate tax liability upon death. This conclusion was
based upon the fact that no express authority existed in the Probate Code
for such a transfer. In the lower court findings of fact were made that
abundant funds were available for the ward's care (annual income being
approximately $274,000) ; all prospective heirs were in favor of the transfer; that prior transactions of the ward, before becoming incompetent,
demonstrated she was appreciative of tax savings and she had in fact made
numerous such gifts for tax savings purposes; that the gift contemplated
was in fact in the mind of the ward at the time she became incompetent
and she was prevented from carrying it out only by reason of her incompetency; that the ward, if competent, would make the gift for such
purpose; and that, even if the ward died within three years, the gift would
still result in savings on federal estate tax of approximately $240,000, as
the gross estate of the decedent would be reduced by the amount of the
federal gift tax paid, with the gift tax paid allowed as a credit against
estate tax.
Although the result in the Neal case would seem to foreclose the question as the Probate Code now is written, this has been a problem that has
arisen in other jurisdictions where legislation has been passed to allow
such gifts for tax reduction purposes. Such legislation would be salutary
in this jurisdiction.
61408 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
62

TEX. PROB.
63412 S.W.2d
4
1 TEX. PROB.
"407 S.W.2d

CODE ANN. §§ 4, 242 (1966).
73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
CODE ANN. §§ 3(r), 28, 31 (1965).
770 (Tex. 1966).
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PRIVATE TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIONAL PROBLEMS AND
EFFECT OF PROVISIONS

(14) Seemingly, perpetuities cases presented problems for the courts in
the last year. In the trust area the Texas Supreme Court was presented with
such a problem in the case of Rekdahl v. Long."
In this case the provisions in question were contained in a testamentary
trust, part of the decedent's will. Following specific gifts of income for
life to the brother, sister, and son of the decedent, the will contained two
provisions to accumulate income up until the time of the death of the
decedent's son. It was then provided that after all the foregoing had been
satisfied, any income remaining should be paid to the son of the decedent
for life, and upon his death one-fourth of the income would be paid to
the son's surviving wife, with the remainder of the income to be paid:
[I]n equal shares to his children who survive him, provided that if any
child of Aramis Rekdahl dies leaving issue then such issue shall take the
share which his or her parent would have taken had he or she survived him.
• . . Such payments shall continue until such child receiving hereunder is
thirty-five years of age, at which time each of such children successively becoming 35 years of age, shall cease to receive any money therefrom and the
full balance of such payment shall be made to such child or such children
of Aramis Rekdahl who has not or have not attained the age of thirty-five
67

years, ...

It was further provided that upon the death of the brother and sister
of the decedent and upon the time that all of the children of Aramis
Rekdahl have reached thirty-five years of age, the trust should terminate
and be distributed "in equal and undivided shares to the children of Aramis
Rekdahl who survive him, provided, however, that if such children die
leaving issue who survive Aramis Rekdahl, then such issue shall take the
share which such parent would otherwise have taken."' The trust also
contained a spendthrift provision to the effect that none of the assets or
income would vest in any of the beneficiaries until (1) termination of the
trust, or (2) such assets or the income therefrom were actually paid.
The plaintiff, Aramis Rekdahl, son of the decedent, contended that, as
the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust could not be determined until the
period of ultimate distribution of the estate, the trust created by his
mother's will was void by virtue of violating the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The precise question involved in the case, therefore, was a determination
of the meaning of the terminational language of the trust which provided
"if such children die leaving issue who survive Aramis Rekdahl, then such
issue shall take the share which such parent would otherwise have taken.""
It was argued by the plaintiff that the language could be interpreted to
include a child of the son, Aramis, born after the decedent's death which
child could outlive all other children of Aramis, for a period of more than
66417 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1967).
7

6

ld. at 393.

"'ld. at 390.
69Id.
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twenty-one years and then die. Since the child was not a life in being termination of the trust would occur beyond the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
The court correctly construed the will as designating the death of
Aramis Rekdahl as the moment in time when the determination of all beneficiaries would be made. The gift was held to be substitutional, at the
death of Aramis, to children or issue of deceased children, as the case may
be. Since the termination of the trust was to be measured by the life of
Aramis Rekdahl, a life in being, it did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(15) In Marshall v. Land"0 there was an attempt to create an inter vivos
trust and at the same time to reserve extensive rights of control over the
property. It was held that the instrument in question was an attempt to
make a testamentary disposition of the wife's interest in the community
property, and was void as it did not comply with the Statute of Wills.
The court mentioned in passing that if the instrument had been a valid
testamentary disposition, as it attempted also to dispose of the wife's onehalf interest in the community property, she would have the right to elect
against the will and claim her half of the community.
After holding that the instrument was an invalid attempt to make testamentary disposition, the court also disposed of the contention that it
might have been a gift of the securities in question. Due to the extensive
rights of control reserved in the grantor, the court held that the right of
the grantor to control and manage the property after execution of the instrument was identical to the right existing before the instrument was
executed and, hence, no gift was in fact made.
A point was raised but not passed on by the court that the instrument
constituted an illusory trust, as exemplified in the New York case of

Newman v. Dore."'
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error in Land v. Marshall
to consider three points of error raised by petitioner's brief."' These points
concern, first, the testamentary character of the gift; secondly, the severance of title in the trust property by the grantor; and, finally, whether
this constituted fraud on the wife's interest as a matter of law. That decision should provide illuminating interpretation as to the nature of the
husband's control and the extent of his power.
VI.

PRIVATE TRUSTS-ADMINISTRATION

(16) Thorman v. Carr"5 is the second of the two most significant cases
decided by the Texas courts in the wills and trusts field during the reporting period. This case involved the allocation of funds between income and
corpus, i.e., life tenant and remainderman, under a testamentary trust.
'0 413 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted. For further discussion, see McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, this Survey, at footnote 61.
7'275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
7211 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 35 (1967).
73412

S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1967).
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Involved was the proper allocation of a seven per cent debenture with
face value of $2,950, net proceeds from the sale of 117 shares of stock,
and the gain in value of the stock through appreciation. The 117 shares of
stock consisted of 110 shares which originally formed part of the trust corpus, and seven which represented a stock dividend (excluding gain in value
from time of inception of the trust). The trust contained a clause giving
the trustees discretion to determine principal and income. In an action for
declaratory judgment the trial court determined that the trustees had improperly allocated to income both the debenture and the net proceeds from
the sale of the securities. However, they had properly allocated to income
the gain in value through appreciation of the securities. The holding was
affirmed by the court of civil appeals. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of
Texas error was refused, n.r.e., in a per curiam opinion as to the holding of
the lower court that the debenture and the net proceeds of the stock sale
should be allocated to corpus. The allocation of the gain in value by appreciation was not before the court.
Apparently the trustees were of the opinion they were authorized,
under the discretionary clause of the trust, to make any allocation they
desired. However, as no wording such as "absolute," "full," or "uncontrollable" was contained in the clause, the lower court was of the opinion
that the trustees were bound to exercise their discretion in a reasonable
manner. In refusing error the supreme court stated that the absence of
such wording was of no significance, but did not further discuss the standard of action for the trustee. Although it would seem unquestionable that
the debenture which formed part of the trust should be allocated to the
trust corpus, it is unfortunate that the court did not go into a more extended discussion of the problems involved in securities allocation under a
discretionary clause. Rather than unduly lengthen this Survey Article,
attention is drawn to an excellent discussion of the case and underlying
law in a recent issue of the Journal."
(17) In a court of civil appeals opinion"5 a trustee was held to be excused neither from liability for self-dealing, nor from failure to make
an estate productive, by an exculpatory clause contained in the trust instrument.
VII. CHARITABLE TRUSTS

(18) Few cases were found dealing with charitable trusts during the
reporting period. Although Coffey v. William Rice University"l technically falls within the period now being reported it was discussed in the last
Survey and attention is directed to such discussion."
(19) It is generally stated that one of the essential characteristics of a
charitable trust is an indefinite beneficiary. In a court of civil appeals
"4Note, The Discretionary Allocation Clause in a Trust Instrument-Broad or Narrow Construction by Texas Courts?, 21 Sw. L.J. 824 (1967).
"Langford v. Shanburger, 417 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
"0408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
77Galvin, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 16, 22 (1967).
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opinion"8 it was held that the conveyance in trust of a tract of 3.18 acres
of land, to be "used as a park for educational and recreational purposes"
for all persons who had purchased or would purchase property from subdivider's 500-acre tract, did not constitute a charitable trust as the beneficiaries could readily be identified. The trust was construed to be a private
revocable express trust that could be revoked without joinder of the Attorney General of Texas. No discussion was made whether an equitable
dedication of the park had occurred.
It might be mentioned that the more modern view of beneficiaries
of a charitable trust does not necessarily depend upon whether they are
identifiable. Of more significance is whether the group constitutes a sufficiently large segment of society that the benefit of such a group for charitable purposes is socially desirable. For instance, a trust to provide for
medical and health benefits of a labor union has been upheld as a charitable trust, although all members entitled to such benefits may be readily
ascertainable." Application of this test might have produced a different result in the subject case.
VIII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

It is not possible to incorporate the details of the legislative changes,
and reference is made to the amended statutes.
(20) Probate Code section 320A was amended to provide for the payment of funeral expenses and similar items out of the decedent's estate
rather than from the community share of the surviving spouse."0
(21) The amendment having the broadest application is that amending
Probate Code section 57, where the age requirement necessary for the
execution of a will was lowered from nineteen to eighteen years of age.'
(22) It should also be noted that Probate Code sections 181, 248, 249,
250, and 256, have been amended, and section 254 has been repealed, to
conform with the pattern of payment of state inheritance taxes through
state offices in Austin, Texas, rather than through the local probate courts.
The amendments affected the form of the order granting letters testamentary or of administration and orders for the appointment of appraisers and
appraisement.Y

"' Butler v. Shelton, 408 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"In re Pattsberg's Will, 282 App. Div. 770, 123 N.Y.S.2d $64 (1953).
"°TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 320A (1967).
" Id. § 57.
"2Id. §§ 181, 248-50, 254 (repealed), 256.

